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THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 3, Number 14 (October 7, 1998) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENT 
Strikes aim at ouster of president 
Building on resentment over wage arrears and the fiscal meltdown of recent 
months, organizers of nationwide strikes slated for 7 October attempted to focus 
anger on President Yel'tsin. Gennadi Zyuganov, who was instrumental in the 
selection of the new prime minister, denounced previous government officials 
and targeted Yel'tsin in his address "To The Working People" on the eve of the 
strikes: 
 
"Gaidar stole your savings; Chubais stole your property; Chernomyrdin stole your 
pay. (...) Yel'tsin is an obstacle in everyone's way, and won't allow either you or 
the government or the parliament to work." (Sovetskaya Rossiya, 6 Oct 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-278) 
 
Presidential preparations for the rallies included meetings with the heads of the 
power ministries and plans to quell large disturbances, however early reports 
suggest that attendance at the strikes and rallies will fall well below the 
anticipated 20 million or more participants, numbering instead in the hundreds of 
thousands. (BBC World Service, 7 Oct 98) 
 
'He doesn't understand' 
Part of the nearly inevitable fallout of an acrimonious dismissal of employees, 
such as occurred with the fall of the Kirienko government, is the reflex to 
disparage the former boss. In this case, the disgruntled employee is former 
Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, once touted as a presidential favorite and 
 2 
potential successor, and he has let loose scathing criticism of the president in an 
interview with The Washington Post.(29 Sept 98; nexis) 
 
Nemtsov describes strong initial support from the president, but, confirming what 
we have long surmised, the president's health interfered with his ability to govern 
effectively: "He was very weak, he was not ready to struggle." 
 
As Nemtsov's attempts to implement reforms were frustrated in the 
Chernomyrdin government, he sought assistance from the president, who offered 
little more than encouragement. Nemtsov claims, "He didn't understand it. (...) He 
thought it was just intrigue. He always understands power as just personnel 
decisions. He doesn't understand; it wasn't just intrigue." 
 
When Yel'tsin finally did dismiss Chernomyrdin, it was not, as was claimed at the 
time, an attempt to reinvigorate the reform process, but rather arose from 
Yel'tsin's fear "of (losing) his power," according to Nemtsov. 
 
The substance of Nemtsov's remarks are not particularly startling as it has been 
clear since the beginning of Yel'tsin's presidency that his strength lay not in his 
grasp of policy issues, but in his sense of political timing. What is remarkable is 
that Yel'tsin's political sense so failed him. 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Chernomyrdin targets Zyuganov 
Clearly bitter from his unsuccessful confirmation campaign, former Prime Minister 
Viktor Chernomyrdin has withdrawn from an election for a Duma seat claiming, 
"...I do not want to work in that Duma after what has happened!" 
(Komsomol'skaya pravda, 26 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-271) 
 
When asked to explain who was behind the intrigues that prevented his regaining 
the premiership, Chernomyrdin answered simply, "Zyuganov." Describing a 
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conversation with Zyuganov, Chernomyrdin says that Zyuganov announced that 
Luzhkov was the Communists' candidate and that they planned to form a "left-
centrist" government. While Chernomyrdin has often been cited as an able 
reconciler of diverse political approaches and capable of working both with 
radical economic reformers as well as the Communist and nationalist Duma 
factions, this recent battle has elicited an uncharacteristically caustic remark 
aimed at Zyuganov and his party: "The leftists are grave diggers and are trouble 
for Russia. The whole world has purged itself but we continue to suffer this 
trouble." 
 
Government staffing limps forward 
Prime Minister Primakov surely has a tough sell in recruiting personnel to his new 
government: (the ruble is worthless, hyperinflation is likely, winter is coming and 
the harvest looks bad...), but no finer point could be put on the issue than the 
slow process of finding willing ministers and officials. The most current roster of 
appointees is as follows: 
 
Prime minister: Yevgeni Primakov; first deputy prime ministers (2): Yuri 
Maslyukov, economy, Vadim Gustov, state building, national, regional and youth 
policies, problems of the Russian north; deputy prime ministers (4): Vladimir 
Bulgak, industry and communications, Gennadi Kulik, agriculture, Aleksandr 
Shokhin[**], finance, relations with international financial organizations, Valentina 
Matvienko, social issues; federal ministers (14): Sergei Stepashin, interior 
minister, Sergei Shoigu, minister for civil defense, emergency situations and 
management of natural disasters, Boris Pastukhov, minister for CIS affairs, Igor 
Ivanov, foreign minister, Mikhail Kirpichnikov, science and technology minister, 
Ramazan Abdulatipov, minister for national policies, Mikhail Zadornov, finance 
minister, Igor Sergeev, defense minister, Nikolai Aksenenko, railway minister, 
Sergei Generalov, fuel and energy minister, Giorgi Gabuniya, trade minister, 
Sergei Frank, transport minister, Andrei Shapovalyants, economics minister, 
Pavel Krasheninnikov, justice minister. Posts of 10 federal ministers remain 
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vacant: antimonopoly policies, nuclear energy, state property, health, culture, 
secondary and vocational occupation, natural resources, regional policies, 
agriculture and food labour, and social development. (ITAR-TASS, 1209 GMT, 
25 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-268) 
 
[**] With the appointment of Mikhail Zadornov as finance minister, Aleksandr 
Shokhin (who was under the impression that he would be in charge of finance) 
resigned, calling the Zadornov appointment "a political mistake." (Interfax, 1518 
GMT, 25 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-268) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough and Sarah Miller 
 
Despite US dissatisfaction, Seleznev calls for expanding links with Iran 
Either in spite of or because of US opposition, Russia continues to strengthen its 
relationship with Iran, building a strategic alliance with the Islamic Republic. From 
20-23 September, Russian State Duma Chairman Gennadi Seleznev ignored US 
dissatisfaction by further strengthening Russian-Iranian relations during an 
official visit to Iran. During the three-day visit he stressed the need to expand 
Russia's partnership with Iran in the economic and cultural spheres despite the 
fact that "the United States is still sharply criticizing Iran and calling it a country of 
terrorists." Seleznev led a parliamentary delegation that held high-level meetings 
with Iranian first vice-president Hassan Habibi, parliament speaker Ali Akbar 
Nateq-Nuri, Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh, and Iranian spiritual leader 
Aytollah 'Ali Khamene'. Following the official visit Seleznev told a news 
conference in Moscow on 24 September that he and Iranian senior officials 
"reached total mutual understanding" on the need to step up Russian-Iranian 
cooperation, emphasizing that Russia will complete the construction of a nuclear 
power station in Iran "in spite of the US dissatisfaction." Seleznev not only was 
outspoken on cultural and economic ties with Iran, but he also stressed that 
 5 
Russia will continue to sell arms to Iran. "Iran is a reliable partner of Russia," he 
said. (IRNA, 1557 GMT, 22 Sep 98; FBIS-NES-98-265, and Interfax, 1336 GMT, 
24 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-267) 
 
Seleznev also used the visit to highlight Russia's support for Iran's stance against 
the Taliban which Iran has accused of killing Iranian citizens in Afghanistan. 
During his meeting with Expediency Council Chairman [Akbar] Hashemi-
Rafsanjani, the Duma chairman expressed deep regret over the inhumane 
actions by the Taliban in Afghanistan and said that the current situation in 
Afghanistan goes against all international norms and principles. He added that 
Russia shares Iran's view that a coalition government comprising all groups 
should come to power in Afghanistan. Seleznev also stated his support for Iran's 
action to deploy forces and stage exercises along the country's western borders 
aimed at preventing the spread of insecurity and drug smuggling in border 
regions. Speaking to the official Iranian news agency, he added that, due to the 
presence of the Russian border guards at the Afghan frontiers of Tajikistan, "the 
Taliban don't also dare to violate the borders of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States." (Television First Program Network, 22 Sep 98; FBIS-NES-
98-265, and IRNA, 1321 GMT, 22 Sep 98; FBIS-NES-98-265) 
 
Although Russia has repeatedly denied providing military support to anti-Taliban 
forces fighting for control of Afghanistan, Moscow has consistently supported 
Iran's anti-Taliban position, especially following the reported deaths of Iranian 
citizens at the hands of the Taliban forces in central Afghanistan. It is unlikely 
that Moscow would provide overt military support to Iran in the event of an 
Iranian-Taliban war, however, Iran could expect an infusion of weapons and 
supplies from Moscow in the event of a war with the Taliban.  
 
New foreign minister hits the ground running 
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov spent nearly a week in the United States 
attending the 53rd session of the United Nations General Assembly and 
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conducting ministerial and bilateral meetings in both New York and Washington. 
Ivanov's first trip to the United States as foreign minister came less then 10 days 
after assuming his new role in Primakov's government. During Ivanov's trip to 
New York, the 53-year-old career diplomat addressed the United Nations 
General Assembly where he stressed the principle that the force of the law takes 
precedence in world politics over the right to use force. Although he did not 
specifically refer to NATO proposals to use force against Serbian forces in 
Kosovo during his speech to the UN, he took numerous opportunities during his 
visit to stress Moscow's opposition to any outside use of force in Kosovo. 
(Rossiyskaya gazeta, 25 Sep 98, weekend edition, p. 2; FBIS-SOV-98-268, and 
ITAR-TASS, 0239 GMT, 20 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-263) 
 
In addition to a ministerial meeting with the G-7 group of ministers, Ivanov met 
with Iraq's Foreign Minister Muhammad Sa'id al-Sahhaf. The two foreign 
ministers discussed topics related to Iraq's relationship with the Security Council. 
Sources of the Iraqi delegation to the UN General Assembly's session told an 
Iraqi news correspondent in New York that the meeting was very positive and 
that Ivanov expressed Russia's understanding of Iraq's demand to close the 
weapons files as soon as possible (INA, 0920 GMT, 23 Sep 98; FBIS-NES-98-
266) -- a position that Russia has repeatedly supported during Security Council 
sessions. 
 
In addition to his meetings in New York, Ivanov delivered a personal message 
from President Yel'tsin to President Clinton. Ivanov said the message expressed 
"deep satisfaction with the development of bilateral relations between Russia and 
the United States on principles of equitable partnership." (ITAR-TASS, 0008 
GMT, 25 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-268) The message of "equitable partnership" 
was reinforced by Ivanov during an interview with ITAR-TASS. Ivanov, stressing 
Russia's nuclear power and responsibility, stated that Russia assumes "special 
responsibility as a nuclear power, as a great power and as a permanent member 
of the UN Security Council, for maintaining peace and security, and we will 
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continue to pursue an active, constructive foreign policy." (ITAR-TASS, 1944 
GMT, 24 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-267) 
 
Despite view of experts, further delay on START-II ratification likely  
Colonel Sergei Glotov, one of the leaders of the nonpartisan "anti-NATO" 
movement of Duma deputies, recently spoke out against ratification of START-II. 
He said in a 30 September interview that Russia is willing to continue the 
dialogue on reducing nuclear arsenals, but the country's national interests must 
be heeded. These latest comments against a speedy ratification followed a 
series of visits to units of Russia's Strategic Missile Troops by a representative 
group of Duma deputies. Based on these visits Glotov stated that "in harsh 
financial circumstances, the country's missile troops continue to carry out their 
combat duties in an exemplary manner. They are maintaining launchers in tip-top 
condition and fully ensuring Russia's national security," he said. "We should not 
hurry to make a final decision on cutting our deterrent." (ITAR-TASS, 1229 GMT, 
30 Sep 98; FBIS-UMA-98-273) 
 
These latest anti-START-II comments were issued a day prior to statements 
made by a group of Russian defense ministry experts in favor of the speedy 
Duma ratification of the treaty. The defense experts maintain that, given the 
present situation in Russia, it is very difficult for the country to maintain nuclear 
parity with the United States in total nuclear potential. The experts noted that in 
the absence of additional funding, which appears to be unlikely, Russia's nuclear 
capability by the year 2003, in all three sectors of the nuclear triad will fall far 
below the levels specified in the START-II treaty. (Interfax, 1 Oct 98; FBIS-TAC-
98-274) 
 
Mixed reactions from Moscow follow Germany's election results 
A Russian foreign ministry statement that was issued following Germany's 
election results was cautiously optimistic concerning the changing of the guard in 
Germany's leadership. The statement said that Moscow hopes the new German 
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government will promote the further consolidation of good-neighborliness, 
partnership and mutual trust between Russia and Germany. (ITAR-TASS, 1038 
GMT, 28 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-271) In a different forum, foreign ministry 
spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin, referring to the "expanded format" under which 
the last Russian-German summit was held in June of this year, said Moscow 
hopes that this and other forms of close cooperation between Russia and 
Germany would be continued in the future. (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 30 
Sep 98) 
 
However, the view from the Duma was a little less optimistic. Vladimir Lukin, 
chairman of the Duma International Affairs Committee, was quick to state that 
relations between Russia and Germany will change. In an interview with a 
Moscow radio station, Lukin stated that "relations in Kohl's day were rather 
feudal, patriarchal, and conservative" and that in the future he thought that 
relations between the new Socialist Democratic-led government in Germany and 
Russia would not have the same "intensity" as before because the new 
government in Germany will get "bogged down" in domestic affairs. 
(Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy, 1500 GMT, 28 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-271) 
 
Duma member: Possible Turkish attack on S-300 sites is act of war 
In an interview with Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation that will be broadcasted on 
7 October, Aleksei Arbatov, the alternate chairman of the Russian Duma's 
Defense Committee, said Russia believes that a possible Turkish intervention 
during the delivery of the S-300 missiles in Cyprus would constitute an act of war 
against Russia and would be answered militarily. Russia will react with political, 
not military, means if Turkey attacks the missile sites after the missiles are 
installed in Cyprus because there is no mutual security treaty or agreement with 
Cyprus. He said the Russian Duma could ratify such an agreement within one 
day. 
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In the interview, Arbatov stressed that safeguarding Cyprus' unity, independence, 
and territorial integrity is of vital importance to maintain the balance in an area 
that extends from the Black Sea to Cyprus. (Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation 
Radio Network, 24 Sep 98; FBIS-WEU-98-267) 
 
Let the summits begin 
It seems that a series of summits with Asian heads of state just might come to 
fruition this Fall, barring any major domestic catastrophes. Earlier this year, a 
Sino-Russian summit was postponed due to flooding in China, while the 
momentum of Russo-Japanese relations slowed due to government changes in 
both countries. For the time being, relations with both countries appear to be 
back on track. 
 
A series of meetings between Russian and Japanese officials are bringing the 
two countries a step closer to the much anticipated "shirt-sleeves" summit on 11-
12 November. (Kyodo, 2349 GMT, 21 Sep 98; FBIS-EAS-98-264) Of note was a 
particularly fruitful meeting between former Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro 
Hashimoto and President Boris Yel'tsin. It was reported that Yel'tsin pledged to 
respond to an as-yet-unreleased Japanese proposal on the Kurile Island issue at 
the upcoming summit with Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi. Resolution of the issue, 
the conclusion of a peace treaty by 2000 and the implementation of an economic 
cooperation plan remain at the top of Russian-Japanese relations. (Jamestown 
Foundation Monitor, 18 Sep 98) The Japanese media have suggested that the 
government has proposed a "Hong Kong option" by which the Japanese would 
obtain de facto control of the islands, to be followed by a handover at specified 
date in the future. (Interfax, 1629 GMT, 25 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-268) Yel'tsin's 
pledge to respond to the proposal could prove to be complicated for him; 
following through with a response to the Japanese could strengthen bilateral 
relations with Japan while providing the conservative domestic opposition in 
Russia further ammunition against him. Any territorial change of hands could be 
spun as a blow to Russian territorial integrity and national pride, thereby turning a 
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possible foreign policy accomplishment into a domestic headache. Luckily, 
Russo-Japanese relations have pushed forward, indicating that although the 
resolution of these issues is a stated goal, economic and political cooperation will 
continue for the time being. 
 
Chinese-Russian economic cooperation continues as well. At an inter-
governmental Chinese-Russian Conversion and Cooperation Forum, the main 
topics concerned bilateral cooperation in science and trade. (Xinhua, 1938 GMT, 
16 Sep 98; FBIS-CHI-98-259) Various projects aimed at boosting economic 
growth have been undertaken of late, including the opening of a sea route from 
China to the ROK via Russia and the commencement of work on a transport 
corridor to China via Vladivostok. (Xinhua, 1205 GMT, 21 Sep 98; FBIS-CHI-98-
264). Economic topics such as these will undoubtedly highlight President Jiang 
Zemin's 11-13 November visit to Russia. 
 
Regarding the peninsular issue, Japan has suggested six-way talks among the 
DPRK, ROK, Japan, the US, China and Russia. Although the proposal is not yet 
official, Russia has responded positively, stating a willingness to participate in 
any form of talks aimed at stabilizing the situation on the peninsula. Russia's 
efforts at normalizing relations with Seoul and Pyongyang could prove to be 
helpful if the Japanese plan is realized. (Voice of Russia, 1200 GMT, 25 Sep 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-269) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
REGIONS 
Regions respond to crisis 
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Regional responses to the present economic and political crisis vary, but two 
tactics seem to be the most common -- price regulation, and limits on inter-
regional trade, primarily exports. How successful such moves have been are not 
known. However, some regions are dealing with escalating prices in a more 
creative way. Rather than capping prices, the government of Arkhangelsk has 
flooded the market with locally produced goods in order to keep supply up and 
prices down, according to the head of its legislature Nikolai Malakov. It is not 
immediately clear where the extra food is coming from or how the region plans to 
pay for the program. In Stavropol, leaders have established a series of "fairs," or 
more accurately, farmers' markets, whereby any producer -- either private or 
institutional --can sell directly to the public, thereby eliminating the middlemen 
often accused of exacerbating the crisis with greedy profit-taking. Again it is not 
clear if the fairs will operate under some pricing system, or whether free market 
mechanisms will set prices. (ITAR-TASS, 1438 GMT, 6 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
249) 
 
Problems with the Vladivostok mayoral election 
The territorial election commission ruled on 26 September that acting mayor 
Viktor Cherepkov was ineligible to run for election. With no time to change the 
ballots printed days earlier, the decision was taken to cross out his name with 
ballpoint pens. Predictably, the people of Vladivostok believed something more 
sinister was afoot and they complained loudly and at times violently, with a 
couple of fistfights being reported. The president's representative in the Maritime 
Territory and the chief of the local Federal Security Service said that, even if the 
removal of Cherepkov's name from the ballot was a correct one, it was handled 
very poorly. Even so, the required minimum number of voters participated so the 
elections, however messy, will most likely be considered valid. (NTV, 1200 GMT, 
27 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-270) 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Duma members pass law on wages and benefits 
 12 
In the midst of Russia's economic crisis, deputies of the State Duma have been 
thinking of their own futures by passing an amendment to the present law 
regulating their legal status, wages and benefits. The law, eloquently titled the 
"Law on Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Federal Law on the 
Status of a Federation Council Deputy and Status of a State Duma Deputy of the 
Russian Federation Federal Assembly," increases deputies' pay to the rate of a 
governmental minister, and provides him or her with additional payments for 
vacations, illnesses, and "Kurorten" or sanatoria. The additional benefits are, of 
course, tax-free. 
 
Most interesting are articles 33 and 25. Article 33 ensures "the right to secure 
housing in the city of Moscow." This article provides "lump-sum compensation for 
the acquisition of housing with right of ownership." In effect, each deputy will be 
able to purchase and own an apartment in the capital at taxpayers' expense. 
Article 25 protects deputies in the event of the Duma's dissolution. It provides a 
lump-sum monetary payment "covering the period remaining in their term, but not 
to exceed one year." 
 
Perhaps it should not be surprising that the deputies of the second Duma are 
busily constructing golden parachutes for themselves in the event they are cast 
out onto the economy they helped create. But such self-attention at a time of 
national emergency cannot possibly sit well with those in the hinterlands 
struggling to make ends meet. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 11 Sep 98, p. 2; FBIS-SOV-
98-259) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Michael Reardon and Charles Drummond 
 
Who's watching the prisoners? Not the Interior Troops 
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Back on 1 August, President Boris Yel'tsin signed a new defense concept 
document which outlined sweeping changes to the Russian armed forces. 
Included within was a diminished role for the Internal Troops of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MVD). It basically stated that the MVD will play the chief role in 
stopping, localizing and neutralizing internal armed conflicts on Russian 
Federation territory. The MVD will retain militaryforces, including some armored 
units, but will give up its current function of guarding communications facilities 
and convoys. Recruitment for this reformed federal guard will be conducted on a 
contract basis. (See Editorial Digest, Vol. III, No. 10) Almost seven weeks later, 
on 17 September, President Yel'tsin signed an edict concerning the MVD reform, 
providing additional details to the aforementioned defense concept. (Rossiyskaya 
gazeta, 23 Sep 98, p. 3; FBIS-SOV-98-272) 
 
The edict calls for a strength reduction of 54,000 troops by 1 January 1999, with 
the main aim being to make the Interior Troops into a force for ensuring citizen's 
safety and fighting crime. This is a deep cut into theover 300,000-member force 
built by former Minister of the Interior Anatoli Kulikov just a few years ago, when 
the Interior Troops were reminiscent of a second Russian Federation army. 
Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin said, "The reforms envisage a move away from 
the troops' armed forces component, and their main task will remain the 
localization of internal conflicts." (NTV, 1800 GMT, 17 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
260) 
 
Other significant aspects of the decree are as follows: 
-The foundation of the Interior Troops will consist of three mobile groups of four 
or five divisions, which will be manned by contract soldiers. 
- Only officers will serve in the independent operational division, the former 
Dzerzhinsky division. 
- Interior Troops will hand over convoy functions to the Ministry of Justice. 
- Most units guarding many important state facilities will be removed and 
disbanded. 
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- Special mechanized police units that used to be part of the Interior Troops will 
be cut and handed over to the command of regional interior directorates. 
- The seven current Interior Troops districts will be reduced to four: Central, 
Volga Basin, Siberian and North Caucasus. (NTV, 1800 GMT, 17 Sep 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-260) 
 
The decree was not unexpected by Interior Troops' officers as their central 
directorate had prepared proposals for reform two months ago; however, why 
Yel'tsin signed it on 17 September was a mystery. Concerning the decree, 
current commander-in-chief Pavel Maslov said, "[it] only strengthened the 
concept of reform developed by the central directorate." Furthermore, referring to 
its contents, he commented, "We drafted this decree together, so it contains our 
ideas, too. Why shouldn't we be happy?" 
 
It is interesting to note that on the same day President Yel'tsin signed a decree 
reducing the roles and responsibilities of the Internal Troops, a move which 
allows the country's internal security to be ensured with fewer forces as is the 
practice in many other parts of the world, he also signed a second edict. The 
second edict formed an experimental "municipal police force" outside the 
framework of the interior ministry. The new municipal police force would last for 2 
1/2 years. (Interfax, 1002 GMT, 17 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-260) The size of this 
experimental force could not yet be determined, nor its intended purpose -- 
Presidential/Kremlin bodyguards? 
 
When Hungary, pay for bread with spare planes...or maybe not 
Facing one of the worst harvests in 30 years, Russia reportedly has offered 
Hungary between five and eight MiG-29s in exchange for wheat. The MiG-29s 
being offered have been in use by the Russian military but are far from the end of 
their service life, according to reports. Initial details came from sources in both 
the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow and Russian defense industry. (Interfax, 
1248 GMT, 22 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-265) The next day Minister of Food and 
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Agriculture Viktor Semenov told Interfax that Russia would not import more than 
3 million tons of grain, but did not rule out barter. (RFE/RL Newsline, 23 Sep 98) 
However, on 24 September, both Hungarian and Russian officials told a 
Hungarian newspaper that such a deal is not being considered. (Nepszabadsag, 
24 Sep 98; FBIS-EEU-98-267) The bottom line on this deal is -- don't fire up 
those automatic bread makers just yet. 
 
When you're not on top, you don't get to set the rules 
Recently, Russia has only been interested in selling new arms systems. 
However, considering the country's current economic situation and large debt 
abroad, it appears discussions between Russia and the Czech Republic could be 
headed toward a deal to sell aircraft and aircraft spare parts to offset a debt. 
Currently, Russia owes the Czech Republic on the order of 492 million korunas 
(approximately $3.4 billion). Moscow has been paying off the interest only (to the 
tune of $120 million annually), with the principal payment postponed until 2002. 
(Hospodarske Noviny, 10 Sep 98; FBIS-EEU-98-254) The deal being considered 
includes Tu-154 aircraft (a transport aircraft to replace the 1971 vintage Tu-134) 
as well as spare parts for various fighter, transport, and combat aircraft and 
helicoptors. Czech Defense Minister Vladimir Vetchy confirmed that his 
government has approved the deal when asked during a recent visit to 
Washington, DC. (RFE/RL Newsline, 29 Sep 98) It is becoming strikingly 
apparent that Russian arms dealers are up against hard times, with sales really 
declining. It appears that there would be strong pressure for them to come 
through with any deal that helps the dire economic situation of the Motherland. 
 
Warning: Poverty may cause amnesia 
The Belarusians sold seventeen surplus MiG-29s to Peru back in 1996. At that 
time, Russia warned the Peruvians that the deal might not be the bargain it 
appeared to be on the surface, and vowed not to provide any maintenance 
support or spare parts for these Russian-built planes. Well, that was two years 
ago. Since then, the Russian ruble has taken a nose dive, the military is only 
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starting to be paid for multiple months of back pay, significant arms sales are 
now few and far between, the faces of government have changed more than 
chameleons, and the president's power rating has dipped below that of a "AA" 
battery. Apparently, these hard times have produced a form of selective amnesia 
within at least some Russian decision makers as it is now being reported that the 
arms export company Rosvooruzhenie has signed a contract with the Peruvians. 
In this contract, the Russians will not only sell the Peruvians three additional 
MiG-29s, but will provide maintenance support and spare parts -- for the entire 
Peruvian fleet. (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 18 Sep 98) One hopes this 
forgetful condition won't spread to weapons grade nuclear material and rogue 
nations... 
 
'Close' only counts in horseshoes and hand grenades ... and ICBMs 
Russia completed its summer missile-testing program with the successful launch 
of an intercontinental ballistic missile on 16 September. An RS-12M Topol missile 
(also known as an SS-25) took off from Plesetsk in northern Russia and its mock 
warhead successfully struck its target on the Kamchatka peninsula in far east 
Russia. (RFE/RL Newsline, 17 Sep 98, and Russia Reform Monitor, 18 Sep 98) 
According to the commander of the Strategic Missile Force (SMT), General 
Vladimir Yakolev, "all 57 launches of the Topol missiles have been successful." 
Accounting for the possibility of a liberal range in the definition of "successful," 
the results of this program appear to fall somewhere near the claims by the SMT 
press service. Namely, that the missile test "convincingly proves the high combat 
readiness of the forces and the reliability and technical readiness of ICBMs of 
this type." (RFE/RL Newsline, 17 Sep 98) 
 
The Russian government plans to have 10 SS-27 (Topol-M) missiles produced in 
each of the next two years and 31 per year thereafter. Pentagon officials haven't 
appeared too concerned, saying that Moscow lacks the funds to produce them. 
(Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 17 Sep 98) 
 
 17 
It is true that, even with the production rate above, Russia will only be able to 
field approximately 360 missiles by the year 2010. And it is also true that at that 
point the service life of most of Russia's other 750 strategic launchers will have 
expired. (Russia Reform Monitor, 18 Sep 98) But come on folks -- do the math, 
look at the big picture, smell the rocket fuel! Plesetsk to Kamchatka -- a mock 
warhead accurately on target. This isn't a North Korean No Dong and it certainly 
isn't for defense against China or Afghanistan. The missile tested earlier this 
month traveled roughly the distance from say, Siberia to Topeka, Kansas. Maybe 
we shouldn't focus on the 360 scheduled for production, but rather the 57 already 
tested successfully. 
 
The law of averages was on their side 
Plagued by numerous delays and failures in recent months (see Editorial Digest, 
Vol. III, Nos. 10 & 11), Strategic Missile Troops finally launched a satellite into 
space (and functioning properly) the first time. The SMT press service reported 
that a Molniya-M booster successfully lifted off from Plesetsk space center at 
0341 hours on 29 September. The payload was a Cosmos series satellite which 
will provide long-range telephone and telegraph radio communication and 
broadcast television programs for the defense ministry. (ITAR-TASS, 1444 GMT, 
29 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-272) 
 
Nothing earth-shattering here -- except the aircraft 
It certainly isn't late-breaking news to hear that the level of training for pilots in 
the Russian Air Force is low and getting lower. However, accident statistics 
released in the Russian media in September confirm what analysts following this 
decline have surmised from anecdotal evidence and individual reports for some 
time. Over the past six years this arm of the Russian military has had 30 fatal 
crashes, claiming 276 lives. The overall US military (including Navy and Marine 
Corps pilots) accident rate over the last several years has held steady at 1.5 per 
100,000 flight hours. The Russian rate is more than double: 3.3-4 accidents per 
100,000 flight hours. The simple fact is that Russian Air Force pilots get so little 
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flying time that they are far more accident-prone than US military aviators. Over 
the past six years the Russian Air Force flew, on average, just 180,000 hours 
each year. In contrast, the US Air Force last fiscal year flew more than 2,140,000 
hours, with each active pilot averaging some 240 flight hours. A Russian pilot is 
lucky if he can log one-third of that amount. (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 22 
Sep 98) Before Russian pilots can strive for "practice makes perfect," they should 
concentrate on "practice makes proficient." 
 
Promises made, promises kept? 
In early September the Ministry of Defense promised it would pay back wages of 
Russian military personnel, who have gone months without pay. On 28 
September it was reported that two months worth of back pay had indeed been 
delivered, however, a subsequent report on 30 September stated that only partial 
payments had been made. (RFE/RL Newsline, 29 Sep 98 and 1 Oct 98) 
Regardless of exactly how much money has been paid out so far, the timing of 
the decision to take care of the troops likely was not random. Various domestic 
and foreign news services remarked on the payments occurring just two weeks 
prior to a scheduled country-wide demonstration protesting the government's 
nonpayment of wages. (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 29 Sep 98) 
 
The ministry's original announcement was interesting in both what was stated 
and what was not stated. It was not made clear that back wages across the 
services were to be paid. Only two particular groups were specifically mentioned: 
Personnel stationed outside of Russia were to receive "regular payments," and 
personnel discharged essentially due to the Russian armed forces' downsizing 
were to have "all payments to them" settled. (ITAR-TASS, 1304 GMT, 11 Sep 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-254) The actual payment announcement did not address either of 
those groups; instead, the recipients mentioned were the regular army and 
Russia's "other security services." (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 29 Sep 98) 
Making the military the first segment of the Russian Federation to receive its 
withheld wages comes as no surprise, as any government wanting to stay in 
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power, especially during hard times, might be expected to take care of its military 
personnel. What is surprising perhaps is how long it took for the government to 
act in this regard. Nowhere was the source of the funds mentioned, although it is 
reasonable to figure that the back pay was made possible through the recent 
"emission," the printing of billions of rubles by the returned head of Russia's 
Central Bank Viktor Gerashchenko. 
 
In addition to the money payout, food handouts were to be given to cover past-
due ration issues. (ITAR-TASS, 1304 GMT, 11 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-254) The 
distribution of food handouts was already in progress in at least one location -- 
the defense ministry itself. Moscow's NTV newscast "Segodnya" of 12 
September reported on ministry officials receiving food items and ministry drivers 
receiving field rations. As the piece sardonically noted, "the state suddenly 
remembered its debts" after not paying its forces for over a year. The food 
handouts have not made their way beyond Moscow apparently, as the newscast 
also highlighted the fact that military units were fending for themselves, including 
taking time to harvest potatoes in order to make some money. (NTV, 1500 GMT, 
12 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-255) This is in keeping with the trend across the Russian 
Federation of each region turning inward rather than counting on or expecting 
help from Moscow during these difficult economic times. 
 
In a related development, the finance ministry announced that it was going to 
start payment of back wages to nuclear industry workers by allocating funds to 
the Ministry of Nuclear Energy. Unlike the defense ministry, the finance ministry 
stated how it expected to accomplish this -- through tax collection, "which is 
largely influenced by the activity of local administrations of the administrative-
territorial formations and controlling borders." (ITAR-TASS, 1302 GMT, 14 Sep 
98; FBIS-SOV-257) The reporter from TASS did not avail himself of the 
opportunity to editorialize or predict on the likelihood of the workers receiving any 
back wages any time soon, given this payment source. 
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The trial of retired Captain Nikitin 
The St. Petersburg Times reported that retired Navy Captain Aleksandr Nikitin is 
due to stand trial on 20 October on charges of espionage and treason. (St. 
Petersburg Times, 22 Sep 98; see also ISCIP Perspective, Sep-Oct 96) Nikitin 
turned his attentions to the environment after finishing up his naval career. It is 
his work for the Norwegian environmental organization The Bellona Foundation 
that has him in legal trouble with Russian authorities. Specifically, Nikitin is 
charged with passing classified information to a foreign organization when he co-
authored a report on nuclear contamination and ecological damage caused by 
Russian nuclear-powered submarines. The Bellona Foundation (website: 
http://www.bellona.no) provides detailed coverage on Russian nuclear issues, 
both civilian and military, and as such maintains thorough coverage on the 
Russian navy's Northern Fleet. Its credibility in this area is enhanced by the 
contributions of Captain Nikitin, described by the foundation as a former 
submarine officer and nuclear safety inspector. 
 
The upcoming trial is important for several reasons. Perhaps first and foremost is 
that it cuts to the heart of the question of whether the Russian Federation intends 
to follow its own published rules of law, or continue in the capricious and illegal 
ways of the Soviet Union. The Federal State Security Service (FSB) is in part 
basing its charges against Nikitin on unpublished secret decrees, "which predate 
the Law on State Secrets." (ISCIP Perspective, Sep-Oct 96) In addition, the 
defense has still not received copies of the decrees. Nikitin and Bellona assert 
that all the information detailed in the report is from unclassified documents, and 
indeed the report has an extensive footnote listing to back that claim. 
Interestingly, no one in the Russian Federation power structure, from Yel'tsin on 
down, has told the FSB to back off from what by all accounts appears to be a 
politically motivated scheme. 
 
This trial is also important because it constitutes a bellwether for the old Soviet 
practice of intimidating current and future critics of Russian polices or 
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procedures. The outcome of the trial could have chilling consequences for 
reporting on anything that the authorities deem embarrassing, and will certainly 
hinder future reporting efforts on details of the Russian military forces. 
 
The feeding of the Baltic Fleet 
After the Russian Baltic Fleet announced in early September that it was running 
out of food reserves and had no money to buy more, Lithuania offered up food 
donations. The Russians accepted. (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 15 and 17 
Sep 98). Lithuania's offer was probably as pragmatic as it was magnanimous: 
Most of the Baltic Fleet's personnel (both sailors and supporting ground forces) 
are stationed in Kaliningrad. The fleet admitted to owing over $1 million already 
to Lithuanian food suppliers and that more money was not forthcoming from 
Moscow. (RFE/RL Newsline, 17 Sep 98) Nonetheless, despite no funds to buy 
food, the celebration of "the Soviet-era Tank Troop's Day with exercises 
simulating combat against western forces" took place on 13 September. 
(Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 15 Sep 98) Misplaced funding priorities are 
nothing new to the Russian navy. Noted professor Richard Starr, in a recent 
article in the US Naval Institute's Proceedings, remarked on the navy spending 
"the equivalent of $42 million" on commemorations in 1995 and 1996 at the 
expense of upkeep, operations, salaries or pensions. ("Russia's Navy Remains in 
Decline," US Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1998) 
 
Farther north, the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol is not without its problems. 
There, the senior naval commander criticized Sevastopol authorities' "abusive 
actions," where the one reported example was the revocation of free use of the 
city's transportation system. More germane perhaps was the navy's complaint of 
city pressure on the navy to pay back taxes and utilities debts. The inference 
here again is that no funds are coming from Moscow. (RFE/RL Newsline, 18 Sep 
98) 
 
The Minsk: Scrap metal or China's first aircraft carrier? 
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The Russia Reform Monitor quoted from a Hong Kong newspaper that the former 
Russian aircraft carrier the Minsk arrived in a Chinese shipyard with its gun 
turrets still mounted. The article questioned why a ship ostensibly sold for scrap 
metal would still have weapons systems on board, and suggests that the Minsk 
transaction may very well be an arms sale under another name. (Russia Reform 
Monitor, 7 Sep 98) The sale of the carrier is further evidence of the decline of the 
former Soviet, and now Russian, navy. If the Minsk does resurface as China's 
first aircraft carrier, there still remains the question of what aircraft would be 
embarked on it. Certainly China has helicopters it can assign to the ship, though 
there are no reports that China is seeking to obtain the VTOL Yak-38 fixed wing 
aircraft that the Russian navy flew from its carriers. If refitted with its battery of 
torpedoes, surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missile systems, the Minsk 
would be a formidable addition to the Chinese fleet, even without any aircraft on 
board. The firepower of the carrier would far surpass that of any other ship in the 
People's Liberation Army navy. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
CIS reforms discussed, documents signed 
At a recent meeting of the top economic body of the CIS -- the Presidium of the 
Interstate Economic Committee -- the topics of discussion included CIS reform 
and the creation of a free trade zone. (ITAR-TASS, 0846 GMT, 11 Sep 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-254) Russia's economic crisis has had a significant impact on the entire 
CIS. Interestingly, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma has been at the forefront 
of this movement, suggesting that a free trade zone "would be the best way out 
of the crisis for Ukraine, Russia, and our neighbors." Kuchma cited Kyrgyzstan's 
acceptance into the World Trade Organization as the perfect time to dissolve the 
reigning Customs Union and replace it with a "free trade zone in order to be 
guided by reality." The results of the presidium's meeting will be forwarded to the 
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CIS Heads of Government Council for its review. (Interfax, 1217 GMT, 17 Sep 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-260) The economic rapprochement between Ukraine and 
Russia certainly has played a role in Ukraine's favorable stance towards further 
CIS economic integration. Recent bilateral talks between the parliamentary 
heads were successful in perking Ukrainian interest in a Slavic union of Russia, 
Belarus, and Ukraine. However successful the recent economic talks have been, 
it is clear that Ukraine is sticking to its guns when discussing its border security. 
At an unrelated meeting, GUAM members Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan 
signed a border troop cooperation accord. Georgian Border Troops Commander 
Valeri Chkheidze cited the special "economic relationship among the four CIS 
member states" as a motivation for the accord, adding that "the border 
cooperation of the four countries is not aimed against anyone. Any country is free 
to join the agreement." Moldova is expected to sign the documents at a later 
date. (Interfax, 1243 GMT, 16 Sep 98; FBIS-UMA-98-259)  
 
Iran in the CIS? 
CIS reforms have come to an "evolutionary stage" requiring "smooth, realistic 
decisions," CIS Executive Director Boris Berezovsky said after a special meeting 
of a CIS reform body. Berezovsky provided a concrete example when he said, 
"the rules of the game inside a group of interested countries should be set" and 
then specifically mentioned Iran as a country with which there "is a huge reserve 
in relations." Berezovsky took this muse a step further when he suggested that 
the CIS shouldn't limit itself to the borders of the former USSR. (Interfax, 1544 
GMT, 16 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-259) Iranian ties with the CIS have grown 
stronger as a result of both the situation in Afghanistan and Russia's overall 
foreign policy towards the Middle East. Iran responded, saying only, "Tehran has 
sought ways to expand further areas of cooperation with the CIS states." 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 21 Sep 98) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
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By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Will international lenders save Ukraine? 
In the last month, Ukraine has received $3.9 billion in loans and/or credits from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). (Interfax, 1431 GMT, 7 Sep 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-250, and Interfax, 0857 GMT, 10 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-253) The 
flow of cash was begun by the IMF with a commitment to provide a $2.2 billion 
Extended Fund Facility Loan. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma recently said 
that this IMF decision helped Ukraine "avert a crisis ... similar to the one in 
Russia." The IMF loan was, in fact, the key to both the World Bank's recent 
decision to lend over $800 million to Ukraine, and a decision by the EBRD to 
reverse its earlier position and award Ukraine credits of almost $950 million. (UT-
1 Television Network, 1800 GMT, 16 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-260)  
 
Whether Ukraine has averted a crisis is another question altogether. The 
Ukrainian hryvnya has devalued by at least 35 percent, the country has, in effect, 
defaulted on its internal debt by arbitrarily extending the maturity date of National 
Bank long-term securities from 1999 to 2001, and its ability to pay its external 
debt is dubious at best. (Kiyevskiye vedomosti, 14 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-257) 
Even with the injection of money from lending institutions, Ukraine now has only 
a $1 billion currency reserve, is facing massive inflation, and is dealing with wage 
arrears for some state workers reaching back up to six months. (Intelnews, 2347 
GMT, 13 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-256, and ITAR-TASS, 1103 GMT, 26 Sep 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-269) In addition, Ukraine has lost its biggest export market -- 
Russia. 
 
Yes, Virginia, there is a crisis. It is a crisis, however, that will either be calmed or 
aggravated from within. The country has a relatively well-functioning presidential 
administration, vigorous international support, and a cohesive, if somewhat 
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limited, anti-crisis plan. (Intelnews, 2346 GMT, 13 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-256) On 
the other hand, the Ukrainian legislature recently voted to ask Kuchma to 
eliminate cuts in the 1998 budget that are probably necessary in order to receive 
the next two tranches from the IMF. Ukraine is balanced on the edge of an 
unstable cliff. The actions of the legislature in the coming month will likely be 
paramount in dictating whether the country steps back or falls off. 
 
Caspian oil, here we come!  
At the recent "Silk Route" conference in Azerbaijan, Ukraine presented the joint 
Polish-Ukrainian plan to transport oil from the Caspian Sea, through Odessa, 
Brody and Gdansk to Supsa. The 12 members of TRACECA (Transport Corridor 
of Europe, the Caucasus and Asia) met in Baku to begin to develop a framework 
for connecting the Caspian to Asia and Europe. Ukrainian representatives left the 
conference satisfied after collecting support for their pipeline proposal from both 
Georgia and Azerbaijan. (Intelnews, 0157 GMT, 10 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-253) 
Polish representatives, meanwhile, gave "assurances about U.S. support for this 
undertaking." (Gazeta Wyborcza, 17 Sep 98, p. 1; FBIS- EEU-98-264) Russia, of 
course, has its own ideas about the transportation of Caspian Oil (through 
Russian territory), and had no comment on the Ukrainian plan. Ukraine, however, 
is not waiting for anyone's permission. Upon arriving home, Ukrainian First 
Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Holubchenko told reporters that 300 kilometers of 
a pipeline connecting Odessa and Brody has already been constructed, and an 
oil terminal in Odessa is 20 percent complete, while Polish officials were equally 
confident about the project's completion. (Gazeta Wyborcza, 17 Sep 98, p. 1; 
FBIS-EEU-98-264) 
 
During the conference, President Kuchma also announced the "acceleration of 
the construction of the Illchivsk-Poti railway line," while the transportation 
ministers of Ukraine, Georgia and Bulgaria signed a protocol on the development 
of the Illchivsk-Varna-Poti ferry line. (Uryadovyy Kuryer, 10 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-265) 
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Kuchma to Yel'tsin: Take our food, please 
As expected, the "informal" summit held in Moscow on 18-19 September 
between Presidents Kuchma and Yel'tsin yielded minimal results, with one 
exception. The presidents agreed that Ukraine's debt to Russia will be repaid 
with "goods deliveries, especially food." (ITAR-TASS, 1200 GMT, 23 Sep 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-266) Kuchma said the debt amounts to $1 billion. The food 
deliveries to Russia will, no doubt, be appreciated by the defense ministry's 
officers, who have already gratefully tasted Ukrainian cuisine. Interfax recently 
reported that, whereas food rations used to include fresh meat and fish from 
Russia, "the only delicacy there now is canned meat from Ukraine." (Interfax, 
1402 GMT, 12 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-255) 
 
Bad, bad, little Russians! 
Russian Duma Chairman Gennadi Seleznev arrived in Ukraine last week to 
speak before the Ukrainian parliament, and explain exactly why they should join 
"a strong union of the Slavic states." There was only one problem -- he was 
booed off the podium before he could finish his speech. In his speech, Seleznev 
had begun to discuss "a union without borders, customs barriers and with our 
citizens' sole right to live, work and study in one of the three states without the 
feeling of being foreigners." He said, "I'm convinced such a union will be 
supported by most of our citizens." Apparently, he was wrong. (Interfax, 0914 
GMT, 29 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-272) 
 
The nationalist Rukh faction of parliament began shouting Seleznev down, and 
left the room. The rest of parliament, with the exception of the Communist 
members, continued to interrupt until Seleznev was forced to end his speech 
early. (Interfax, 0835 GMT, 29 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-272) Seleznev later said he 
regretted that "Russian television showed distorted reports about the ... visit to 
Kiev," and wondered why the television didn't show the people in the parliament 
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who "greeted us as Slavic brothers." (Interfax, 0836 GMT, 30 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-273) Delusions can be so comforting. 
 
BELARUS 
All hail Primakov 
Three weeks ago, Belarusian Foreign Minister Ivan Antonovich was railing at 
Russia for not responding to a proposal that the presidents of their countries 
meet. "The attempts to isolate Belarus ... are now being spread onto Russia as 
well," he said. The countries of the West, he explained, "impose their views on 
[Yel'tsin] in these crisis times." (Interfax, 0635 GMT, 14 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
257) My, how things change. Belarus reacted with jubilation to the appointment 
of Yevgeni Primakov as prime minister of Russia. Belarusian President 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka said, "Primakov shared my opinions on many issues 
before he became premier. I think he still does." (Interfax, 1422 GMT, 19 Sep 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-262)  
 
Lukashenka and Primakov went right to work on the "Russia-Belarus Union." On 
30 September, Primakov arrived in Minsk, bringing with him a document 
appointing himself chairman of the "Executive Committee of the Union of Belarus 
and Russia." (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1725 GMT, 30 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
273) After his talks with Lukashenka, Primakov said, "We will do everything to 
ensure that the union becomes stronger...." After all, he said, "When other CIS 
states see that the union member states benefit from being a member of the 
organization, the mood will grow among those countries to join the union." (ITAR-
TASS World Service, 1137 GMT, 30 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-273) Lukashenka 
responded that the new Russian government seems to be on the right course 
now. (Interfax, 1148 GMT, 1 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-274) 
 
Christian values take center stage ... 
"We are an Orthodox country and will always remain devoted to Orthodoxy." With 
those words, President Lukashenka welcomed Russian Orthodox Patriarch 
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Aleksei II to Belarus. Lukashenka also suggested that "Great Christian values" 
should become the "ideology" of Belarus. (ITAR-TASS, 1654 GMT, 24 Sep 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-267) Aleksei II, meanwhile, took the opportunity to praise the 
"Russia-Belarus Union" as a union "of people of the same faith." (Interfax, 0543 
GMT, 28 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-271) 
 
... as food reserves plummet 
Authorities announced on 18 September that "the validity of licenses authorizing 
exports of foodstuffs abroad, which were issued to legal entities in the past, is 
suspended." The official reason given is the necessity to "protect the republic's 
consumer market." Translation -- there is no extra food in Belarus. (Belapan, 
1350 GMT, 18 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-262) In fact, according to an investigative 
report published in the Belarusian Business Journal, Belarus is dangerously short 
of basic food items. The paper reported, "Until recently Belarus had a three-
month store of imported rice, buckwheat and vegetable oil. There is almost 
nothing left today." The article also discovered a severe shortage of "fodder 
grain," suggesting that there may not be enough grain to feed the cattle this year, 
and noted that flour has disappeared. (Belorusskaya delovaya gazeta, 17 Sep 
98, p. 1; FBIS-SOV-98-271) The report, of course, contradicts official 
administration statements, but the government's steps to prohibit the export of 
"foodstuffs" do not. 
 
MOLDOVA 
IMF still refusing to renew lending 
On 22 September, Mark Horton, the IMF's permanent envoy to Moldova, once 
again reiterated that the IMF will not resume lending to Moldova until the country 
puts in place a coherent economic austerity program. Horton said the program 
should include privatization, spending reductions, and pension reforms. In July 
1997, the IMF suspended aid to Moldova when the country failed to make the 
economic changes it had agreed to make a year earlier. Before its aid was 
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suspended, the country received $52.5 million. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1218 
GMT, 22 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-265) 
 
Have nuclear waste, will travel 
It appears that threats by the leaders of the breakaway Dniestr Republic to block 
a shipment of nuclear waste heading from Bulgaria to Russia were just that -- 
threats. Valeriy Kireev, director of the republic's Civil Defense Service, had 
threatened to block the tracks to stop a shipment of nuclear "tailings" that was 
being returned to Eloctrostal City in Russia from the Kozloduy Nuclear Power 
Plant in Bulgaria. (Basapress, 1615 GMT, 26 Aug 98; FBIS-SOV-98-238] 
However, the train(s) apparently arrived in Eloctrostal City during the last week in 
September with no incidents along route. (Romania Libera, 19 Sep 98, p. 7; 
FBIS-EEU-98-264) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Transcaucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
DAGESTAN 
Chronology for September 
Sep 3: Sergei Stepashin, the Russian interior minister, visited the Dagestani 
villages that declared themselves a Muslim territory in August. He promised that 
force would not be used against them. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0958 GMT, 3 
Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-246) 
 
Sep 4: An explosion in Makhachkala killed 16 persons, injured 68 persons, and 
destroyed 10 houses. The district under attack is home to Makhachkala Mayor 
Said Amirov and Dagestani Prime Minister Khizri Shikhasaidov; both survived 
unhurt. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1405 GMT, 5 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-248) 
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Sep 5: Russian and Chechen leaders reacted to the blast. Sergei Stepashin said, 
"Actually, they have declared war on us, and we accept it." To fight the war 
Russia must bolster the interior forces division stationed in Makhachkala. 
(Interfax, 1359 GMT, 5 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-248) Former Deputy Prime 
Minister Ramazan Abdulatipov proposed instituting direct presidential rule to 
ease tensions in Dagestan. (Interfax, 1030 GMT, 5 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-248) 
Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov stated that "under no circumstances will I 
allow to involve Chechnya in Dagestan affairs." (Interfax, 1714 GMT, 5 Sep 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-248) 
 
Sep 9: Magomed Khachilaev, the leader of the Lak national movement, a 
member of Salman Raduev's Caucasian Home organization, and deputy to 
Dagestan's parliament, was arrested in connection with the insurrection he led in 
May 1998. State Council Chairman Mogomedali Magomedov met with other 
members of the Lak movement to explain the arrest. (ITAR-TASS, 1612 GMT, 9 
Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-252) 
 
Sep 10: Salman Raduev announced that he would launch strikes against 
Dagestan unless Khachilaev is released by 13 September. (ITAR-TASS, 1352 
GMT, 10 Sep 98; FBIS-UMA-98-253) 
 
Sep 13: Raduev decided that he would postpone the implementation of his threat 
against Dagestan. (Interfax, 1119 GMT, 13 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-256) 
 
Sep 16: Akhmednabi Makhtigadzhiev was appointed Security Council secretary 
to replace Magomed Tolboev, who was relieved of his duties following 
Khachilaev's insurrection in May. (ITAR-TASS, 1045 GMT, 16 Sep 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-259) 
 
Sep 24: State Council Secretary Magomedov met with Russian Prime Minister 
Yevgeni Primakov. After the meeting Magomedov told journalists: "There are no 
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anti-Russian feelings in Dagestan" and the region has every intention to remain 
within the Russian Federation. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1445 GMT, 24 Sep 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-268) 
 
Sep 26: Russian President Boris Yel'tsin asked Prime Minister Primakov and 
Finance Minister Zadornov to send financial aid to the interior ministry police 
forces in Dagestan. (ITAR-TASS, 1313 GMT, 26 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-269) 
 
ARMENIA 
Armenian passports for Nagorno-Karabakh residents? 
During his electoral campaign to become Armenia's president, Robert Kocharian 
promised that he would create a commission to review the constitution. The 
amendments he proposed then pertained to altering the balance of power 
between the branches of government in favor of the parliament and eliminating 
the prohibition against dual citizenship. So far, Kocharian has shown no 
particular haste to limit his own powers as president; he has, however, renewed 
the call for allowing dual citizenship for the diaspora Armenians. (Snark, 1400 
GMT, 9 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-260) This category includes the Armenians in 
Nagorno-Karabakh. The co-chairman of the Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenian 
interparliamentary commission, Emma Gabrielian, said that Nagorno-Karabakh 
residents would be issued Armenian passports in the future. With time this 
arrangement and the participation of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians as 
candidates in Armenian elections would lead to "unity in the electoral process," 
according to Albert Bazeian, the other co-chairman of the commission. (Noyan 
Tapan, 1300 GMT, 10 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-264) The foreign ministry of 
Nagorno-Karabakh officially denied that Armenian passports were being issued 
to its residents. Rather, they carry Soviet passports and are entitled to "special 
status passports, with a view to carrying out legislative activity on the territory of 
Armenia." (Snark, 1700 GMT, 16 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-264) 
 
The significance of Armenia's TRACECA proposals 
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Armenia participated in the recent conference on the Transport Corridor of 
Europe, the Caucasus and Asia (TRACECA), which is an EU-sponsored set of 
initiatives to promote the development of transportation and communication links 
between Europe and Central Asia via the Caucasus. For Armenia this forum is of 
particular importance because, lacking a seashore, it must depend on overland 
transportation to nearby ports. Armenia has also been subject to a boycott by 
Azerbaijan and Turkey which resulted in a dependence on Georgia and Iran for 
shipping and travel. Armenia proposed three routes to the conference. A railway 
linking Batumi, Yerevan, Nakhichevan, and Tehran; a railway route from Kars to 
Tbilisi via the Armenian town Gyumri; a Yerevan-Tbilisi highway. (Bakinskiy 
Rabochiy, 9 Sep 98, p. 2; FBIS-SOV-98-265) These proposals suggest that 
Armenia intends to continue its reliance on Georgia and Iran and that quite 
extensive travel and trade is possible without Turkey's and Azerbaijan's 
participation. 
 
Ignored by US Congress 
The US Congress has once again renewed the ban on direct aid to Azerbaijan 
which has been in place since 1992. The House rejected the Appropriations 
Committee's recommendation to remove the ban. The Senate version likewise 
maintains the provision. (Snark, 1500 GMT, 19 Sep 98; FBIS- SOV-98-265) The 
administration, which lobbied against the provision and sent a letter expressing 
regret to President Aliev of Azerbaijan, has the power to waive its operation, but 
has not done so in the past. The ban is a particularly bitter pill for Azerbaijan this 
year because the same bill grants Nagorno-Karabakh $20 million. (Turan, 1200 
GMT, 22 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-266) The embargo punishes Azerbaijan for 
maintaining a blockade against Armenia even though the humanitarian crisis that 
led to its initial adoption is long over and Armenia has adapted handsomely to the 
situation. 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Masses rally against upcoming elections 
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The five parties which comprise the opposition to President Heider Aliev held two 
mass protests in the capital. On 12 September the protesters, who wanted to 
rally in Baku's main square, were prevented from doing so by the police. In 
excess of 200 persons were arrested, there were reports of police violence 
against journalists and other participants, as well as allegations of torture while in 
detention. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1707 GMT, 12 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
255) A second rally was held on 20 September and did not involve violence. Both 
rallies attracted in the neighborhood of 50,000 participants.  
 
Opposition leaders have put forward several proposals, some of which are 
contradictory: equal representation on the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) 
for the governing and the opposition parties; the postponement of the elections; a 
dialogue with the authorities; the resignation of the current government. (Turan, 
0500 GMT, 19 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-262, and ITAR-TASS, 1615 GMT, 20 Sep 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-263) While the government has made several important 
concessions to the opposition, like the lifting of censorship restrictions, the 
membership of the CEC became a real stumbling block. And properly so, 
because that institution administers the elections and has the power to curtail 
fraudulent practices. All the same, the OSCE has indicated that the current 
election law and composition of the CEC is compatible with holding democratic 
elections. (Turan, 1700 GMT, 11 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-255) Perhaps the 
opposition underestimated its own popularity in deciding to boycott the election: 
Since they are not participating, they have no chance of winning and all they can 
hope for is a cancellation of the vote. 
 
GEORGIA 
Ajaria-Djavakheti union? 
Aslan Abashidze, the leader of Ajaria, refuted his earlier statement that President 
Eduard Shevardnadze had offered to merge Ajaria and the Samtskhe-Djavakheti 
region under his leadership. (Resonance, No. 268, 1 Oct 98, p. 2; Annotated 
Daily Headlines of the Georgian Press, 1 Oct 98) This possibility was discussed 
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in the Georgian press after the Armenian nationalistic movement, Javakh, made 
known its preference for joining Ajaria. (Resonance, No. 259, 22 Sep 98; 
Annotated Daily Headlines of the Georgian Press, 23 Sep 98) If ever instituted, 
such a union would give the Armenians of the region autonomy but only in 
partnership with the Muslim residents of Ajaria. More importantly, it would form a 
single territorial entity that stretches from Armenia to the Black Sea and to a 
significant degree functions outside of Georgia's direct control. 
 
Border guards take control of some coastline; sign GUAM agreement 
On August 31, Georgian border guards took over for the Russian border guards 
at the Poti port which will serve as a major oil terminal. The transfer did not pass 
without incident; a Russian officer, Colonel Viktor Bashkirtsev, was detained 
briefly while leading a group of 25 armed comrades to Poti. (ITAR-TASS World 
Service, 1413 GMT, 7 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-250) The head of the border 
guards, Major General Valeriy Chkheidze, indicated that, although not limited to 
Poti, the coast guard has made only occasional trips to Batumi and avoids the 
maritime segment of Abkhazia. (Svobodnaya Gruziya, 30 Aug 98, p. 2; FBIS-
SOV-98-267) 
 
The border guards of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova will cooperate 
according to an agreement signed on 16 September. (Interfax, 1243 GMT, 16 
Sep 98; FBIS-UMA-98-259) Although the participant states deny that the 
Economic Consultation Union GUAM has emerged as a counterweight to the 
CIS, the organization thwarts Russia's ambition to control the borders of the CIS 
member states. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
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Foreign ministry denied any possibility of Taliban recognition 
Perhaps carried away by the news that the leaders of the Taliban and the 
(Afghan anti-Taliban) northern alliance had agreed to meet in Bishkek to discuss 
ways of ending the Afghan civil conflict (ITAR-TASS, 0954 GMT, 9 Sep 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-252), Kyrgyzstan's Deputy Foreign Minister, Alikbek Jekshenkulov, told 
ITAR-TASS on 9 September that his government had not eliminated the 
possibility of granting diplomatic recognition to the Taliban. (ITAR-TASS, 0956 
GMT, 9 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-252) The following day, Foreign Minister Erlan 
Abdyldaev informed Interfax in no uncertain terms that, although the Kyrgyz 
government is cognizant of the fact that the Taliban constitute a genuine political 
force in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan continues to recognize former President 
Burhanuddin Rabbani's government as Afghanistan's only legal representative. 
(Interfax, 0807 GMT, 10 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-253) 
 
Kyrgyz armed forces to help guard CIS border 
Following the Commonwealth-98 joint military exercises in which Kyrgyz, 
Kazakh, Belarusian, and Russian troops took part, it was announced that a 
Kyrgyz air defense regiment would soon be joining the other CIS forces which 
guard the CIS member states' external borders. (Vecherniy Bishkek, 8 Sep 98, p. 
2; FBIS-UMA-98-252) The Kyrgyz, Kazakh, Belarusian, and Russian 
governments plan to sign an agreement sanctioning the Kyrgyz forces' 
participation in patrolling the CIS borders, and the Russian government has 
promised to supply more sophisticated air defense equipment. (Kyrgyz Radio 
First Program Network, 1300 GMT, 25 Sep 98; FBIS-UMA-98-268) 
 
Comment 
It was not specified where the Kyrgyz air defense regiment will be stationed. One 
possibility is that the regiment will be used to guard the Afghan border, either in 
Kyrgyzstan or in Tajikistan. Tajikistan's president has repeatedly requested troop 
reinforcements to patrol his republic's border with Afghanistan, particularly since 
the Taliban began taking control of northern Afghanistan. The Russian 
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government has seemed somewhat reluctant to transfer additional numbers of its 
own forces to the Tajik-Afghan border; perhaps the Kyrgyz air defense units will 
be used to meet President Rahmonov's request instead. 
 
Prohibited opposition rally in Jalalabad results in arrests 
On 25 September, an opposition rally in the southern Kyrgyz town of Jalalabad 
was attended by approximately 200 people and resulted in two arrests. The rally 
had been banned by local authorities after its organizers disagreed with town 
administration officials over where the event should take place. (Interfax, 0631 
GMT, 24 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-267) The demonstration was organized by 
Kyrgyzstan's opposition parties, in order to protest a referendum on constitutional 
amendments which is scheduled to take place in October. (Interfax, 1219 GMT, 
25 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-268) President Akaev has proposed a number of 
amendments to Kyrgyzstan's constitution, and in a move to circumvent 
parliament (many of whose members oppose the amendments and are drafting 
their own constitutional changes), his administration is planning to hold a 
referendum. 
 
The rally participants called for the referendum to be canceled and also for Prime 
Minister Kubanychbek Jumaliev's resignation. In the unlikely event that their 
demands should be met, opposition leaders intend to nominate Usen Sadykov, 
leader of the opposition agrarian party and a member of parliament, for the post 
of prime minister. Rally organizers were expecting at least 100,000 people to turn 
out for the protest in Jalalabad, but less than half that number actually appeared 
(Interfax, 0934 GMT, 23 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-266), perhaps due to a fear of 
government reprisals. 
 
Government tries to restrict further inflow of Tajik refugees 
Kyrgyz government authorities have stated that they will grant citizenship rights 
only to those Tajik refugees who arrived in Kyrgyzstan prior to 1995. The 
institution of this new policy was explained in a television broadcast by a private 
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network in Bishkek on 23 September as an attempt to prevent additional Tajik 
citizens from emigrating to Kyrgyzstan, in order to escape the economic 
problems which they face in their own republic. (Voice of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 0330 GMT, 24 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-267) 
 
Comment 
The majority of those Tajik citizens who fled to Kyrgyzstan during Tajikistan's civil 
war are ethnic Kyrgyz, and many of them have probably been taken in by 
relatives. Few of them appear to want to return to Tajikistan, no doubt at least 
partly due to the fact that Tajikistan's economy is in a shambles, but perhaps also 
out of fear. During the civil war, many people were killed or forced to flee based 
not only on their ethnic identity, but also on their regional affiliation. There are 
undoubtedly many Tajik refugees who fear that, if they return home, they will 
once again be targeted by those who originally forced them to leave. It should 
also be pointed out that the Tajik civil war did not come to an end until December 
1996, when the first lasting cease-fire was signed between the Tajik government 
and the opposition. 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Suspects in UNMOT murders confess to crime 
The three men suspected of having carried out the murders of the four UN 
Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) employees in Garm District last July 
have apparently confessed to the crime. Jumakhon Khatami, the head of the 
Tajik interior ministry's press service, informed ITAR-TASS on 13 September 
that, upon being formally charged with the murders and confronted with proof of 
their crime, all three men admitted to killing the UNMOT personnel. The men 
(Mirsomuddin Valiev, Yaqub Darveshev, and Saidrahmon Dovudov) were 
members of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and, according to information 
obtained by members of the investigation, one of them had received training "in 
the science of terror and organizing sabotage" in Afghanistan in 1994. The 
interior ministry claims to have evidence that the murders were neither personal 
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nor "clearly criminal," but thus far ministry officials have declined to provide any 
further details about the motives behind the murders. (ITAR-TASS World 
Service, 0720 GMT, 13 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-256). 
 
Comment 
If one or all of the suspects joined the UTO in or prior to 1994, then the training 
that they received in Afghanistan was most likely military practice in a UTO 
camp. Since many of the UTO forces' attacks on Tajik government and Russian 
guard posts consisted of guerrilla raids, it would not be at all surprising if most 
UTO troops were taught the tactics of guerrilla warfare, rather than of 
conventional combat. 
 
NRC representative shot to death in Dushanbe 
On 22 September at approximately 8:00 a.m., Otakhon Latifi, a member of the 
UTO and a representative on the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), 
was attacked and killed outside of his home in Dushanbe. One eyewitness 
reported seeing a man approach and greet Mr. Latifi immediately before the 
murder took place, and then enter a car that was waiting nearby. Mr. Latifi 
reportedly began running, but then fell to the ground. None of the witnesses 
remembered hearing shots fired, although police found three bullet wounds from 
a pistol in the victim's body. (ITAR-TASS, 0627 GMT, 22 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
265) 
 
Otakhon Latifi was a professional journalist who became involved in politics in 
the 1980s. He obtained the post of deputy prime minister for culture and 
education in 1991 and joined the UTO between 1991 and 1992. After returning to 
Tajikistan in 1997, he became a member of the NRC, chairing the committee on 
legal matters. (ITAR-TASS, 0627 GMT, 22 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-265) 
 
Both the UTO leadership and the Tajik government quickly issued statements 
condemning Mr. Latifi's murder and both sides accused the murderers of 
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attempting to obstruct the inter-Tajik peace process. (Radio Tajikistan First 
Channel Network, 0800 GMT, 22 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-265, and Voice of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 0330 GMT, 23 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-266) The UTO 
leadership further stated that in addition to hindering the reestablishment of 
peace in Tajikistan, the killers also wanted to create conflict between the 
opposition and the government. (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 0330 
GMT, 23 Sep 98, FBIS-SOV-98-266) 
 
Comment 
This is not the first time that a member of the UTO has been killed since the 
December 1996 cease-fire was signed; however, Mr. Latifi's death marks the first 
murder of an NRC representative. The opposition statement blames the spate of 
shootings and threats against its members on the slowness of the peace process 
and also points to this latest tragedy as evidence that the Tajik armed forces 
appear to be powerless to prevent the wave of crime which still plagues the 
country. 
 
Government accuses UTO of ordering UNMOT employees' murders 
Perhaps partially in response to the UTO leadership's declaration that the Tajik 
government is unable to protect its citizens from crime, on 24 September 
President Rahmonov's administration broadcast a statement on Dushanbe's 
Radio Tajikistan First Channel Network in which it accused the UTO of 
committing a variety of offenses. The most dramatic of these accusations was 
that it was a UTO commander who ordered the deaths of the four UNMOT 
personnel last July. The 460 opposition troops who are stationed in Dushanbe to 
provide security for the UTO representatives on the NRC were also charged with 
committing murder; they were blamed for the death of Mr. Imomnazarov, a 
deputy chairman of the Customs Committee, who was killed approximately one 
month ago. The statement also accused a number of UTO commanders (among 
them Sanginov, Mansur, Eshon-i Daroz, and Rawshan) of leaving their zones of 
deployment and attacking and robbing government institutions. All of these types 
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of actions were, of course, deemed threats to the peace process by the 
government's statement. (Radio Tajikistan First Channel Network, 0600 GMT, 24 
Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-267) 
 
Comment 
At least two of the commanders named in the government's statement have been 
denounced by the opposition leadership and are no longer considered to be 
members of the UTO. Sanginov was expelled over a year ago, and the 
government itself describes Rawshan as a former supporter of Rezvon Sodirov's 
militia group, which was a renegade force with no real loyalties to any one side. 
 
Suspension of peace process narrowly averted 
On 26 September, Sultan Khamadov, the press secretary for the UTO, 
announced that the opposition leadership was suspending its members' 
participation in the NRC and in the Tajik government. This action was taken in 
protest of the government's "inability to meet assumed obligations to ensure 
safety of OTO [OTO=UTO] representatives to executive bodies of authority and 
to the National Reconciliation Commission." The fatal attack on Otakhon Latifi 
and an attempt to blow up one of the barges being used to repatriate the last 
group of UTO troops in Afghanistan to Tajikistan were cited as the most recent 
and most dramatic evidence of government impotence in the area of law 
enforcement. In conclusion, Khamadov stated that the UTO would only be able to 
resume its participation in the peace process once Latifi's murderers had been 
identified and opposition personnel had been provided with adequate security. 
(ITAR-TASS, 0923 GMT, 26 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-269) 
 
On 28 September, following an all-day meeting between UTO Chairman Said 
Abdullo Nuri, President Rahmonov and all UTO representatives on the NRC and 
in the cabinet, presidential spokesman Zafar Saidov informed journalists that the 
peace process would continue. President Rahmonov's administration agreed to 
establish a six-member joint commission in order to supervise the investigation of 
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Otakhon Latifi's death, as well as to take additional measures to protect UTO 
members from further such incidents. In a joint statement released by the Tajik 
president and the UTO chairman, the two men called for the formation of a joint 
force to combat organized crime, pledged to adhere to the terms of the "Act on 
Mutual Understanding and Refusal of Mutual Recriminations in Mass Media" and 
agreed to resolve all future disagreements and conflicts through mutual 
consultations. Mr. Nuri and President Rahmonov are also to meet and discuss 
the peace process on a regular basis. (ITAR-TASS, 1901 GMT, 28 Sep 98, 
FBIS-SOV-98-271) 
 
Comment 
Although Tajik government forces and UTO members for the most part have 
stopped fighting each other on the ground since December 1996, the war of 
words between the two sides has not ceased, as these last few weeks have 
amply demonstrated. In the realm of verbal and written recriminations, President 
Rahmonov's administration has a clear advantage over the UTO leadership, 
because the government has access to all of the local media outlets. The UTO is 
rarely given the opportunity to air its views on local television or radio programs, 
and often seems to turn to Iranian radio stations in order to reach at least part of 
Tajikistan's population. Mr. Latifi's murder and the bombing of the barge being 
used to transport UTO troops from Afghanistan undoubtedly did provide much of 
the reason for the opposition's temporary withdrawal from the peace process, but 
the media war between the two sides probably also helped bring an already 
tense situation to the breaking point. The declaration of a cease-fire in the verbal 
war that the two sides have continued to wage, in spite of the peace agreement, 
might go a long way towards increasing cooperation between the government 
and the UTO. 
 
TURKMENISTAN 
President Niazov signs array of economic agreements with China 
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The Chinese government has agreed to grant Turkmenistan a sizable amount of 
economic aid, in the form of a 100-million-yuan easy-term loan, as well as a grant 
of 3 million yuan to be used in the advancement of priority sectors of the 
Turkmen economy. President Niazov also succeeded in obtaining the Chinese 
government's cooperation in the development of Turkmenistan's oil and natural 
gas industries during his four-day stay in Beijing. Eight Chinese companies will 
invest both in Turkmen offshore oil and gas fields and in the construction of a gas 
pipeline from Turkmenistan to China, from where the natural gas will then be 
transported to Japan. The Chinese government also signed a number of 
economic agreements with Turkmenistan, including accords on technological 
cooperation and air communication. Overall, it was a very successful trip for 
President Niazov, who returned to Ashgabat from Beijing on 4 September. 
(Interfax, 1549 GMT, 4 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-248) 
 
Turkey attempts to gain Turkmen cooperation over Afghan conflict 
On 7 September, Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik, a special envoy of the Turkish foreign 
ministry, handed President Niazov a letter from Turkey's President Suleyman 
Demirel in which Turkey's president requested the Turkmen government's aid 
over the issue of the Afghan civil war. In the letter, President Demirel suggested 
holding a conference between his country and the five Central Asian states in 
order to discuss ways of settling the Afghan conflict. The Turkmen president, 
however, refused Turkey's overtures, stating that his government will not violate 
its neutral status by interfering in another state's internal affairs, particularly when 
that state happens to shares a border with Turkmenistan. (ITAR-TASS, 2100 
GMT, 7 Sep 98; FBIS-WEU-98-250) 
 
President Niazov focuses on military reform, sacks two top officials 
On 14 and 17 September President Niazov met with leading members of the 
Turkmen military and law enforcement bodies in order to draw up a list of 
necessary reforms for the armed forces. Increasing discipline in military units and 
improving the training policies of the armed forces are seen as two of the most 
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urgent tasks for military reform. (Turkmen Press, 1105 GMT, 24 Sep 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-268) On 17 September, as part of his efforts to restructure significantly 
his country's armed forces, the Turkmen president fired Defense Minister 
Danatar Kopekov and Chief of the General Staff Akmurad Mulkamanov. First 
Deputy Chairman of the National Security Committee Farid Atamuradov and 
NSC Deputy Chairman for Military Counterintelligence Vladimir Efanov were also 
removed from their posts and a number of other officials were demoted.(Interfax, 
1415 GMT, 17 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-260) 
 
These changes are generally interpreted as a response to the violent incident 
which occurred at the Kazandzhik training base (about 240 km west of Ashgabat) 
of the 212th infantry division on 12 September. Five soldiers raided the camp's 
arsenal and stole 25 weapons, a large supply of cartridges and bullet-proof vests 
and then fled from the camp. On their way, they hijacked a truck, first killing its 
driver and passenger, and then took seven people hostage when they reached 
the village of Garagan in Bakharden District. Law enforcement units eventually 
managed to gain control of the situation, but in the process one policeman and a 
hostage were killed, as well as four of the renegade soldiers. (Turkmen Press, 
1105 GMT, 24 Sep 98, FBIS-SOV-98-268) 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
Government committee boasts of country's mineral wealth 
In an article published in Tashkentskaya pravda on 9 September, Deputy 
Chairman of the Uzbek Committee on Geology Gani Abdurahmanov proudly 
declared that the value of Uzbekistan's already discovered mineral deposits 
currently stands at $35 billion. Uzbekistan contains large uranium deposits 
(according to Mr. Abdurahmanov, his country ranks in the top ten worldwide for 
uranium extraction), substantial copper reserves, as well as silver and gold 
reserves (apparently Uzbekistan is in the top five worldwide for gold deposits). 
Most recently, Uzbek geologists also discovered that their country contains its 
own lithium deposits (lithium is used in electronic, medical and metallurgical 
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technologies). In terms of fuel deposits, Uzbekistan cannot compete with its 
neighbors, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, but according to Mr. Abdurahmanov, it 
does possess over 440 "oil and gas fields, mines, pits and plants" currently in 
operation. (Tashkentskaya pravda, 9 Sep 98, p. 3; FBIS-SOV-98-265) 
 
Comment 
During the Soviet period, Uzbekistan served primarily as a producer of cotton 
and other raw materials for the Soviet economy. Today, cotton is still cultivated 
for export on the hard currency market, but its days as the linchpin of the Uzbek 
economy are numbered. Excessive irrigation and overfertilization have severely 
damaged large areas of Uzbekistan's soil. Central Asia's water resources are 
also quickly shrinking. The Uzbek government will soon need to look to other 
sectors of its economy to produce sufficient revenue for the state budget; 
perhaps one sector being considered is the mineral resource industry. However, 
in order to develop this industry, the Uzbek government will need to attract much 
more foreign investment than it has thus far been able to do. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic Region 
By Kate Martin 
 
LATVIA 
Voters say 'yes' to easing of citizenship requirements 
In a clear signal that Latvian citizens did indeed want their say concerning 
proposed amendments to the country's citizenship law, approximately 70 percent 
of the electorate turned out on 3 October to vote on the referendum. The result 
was a resounding maybe--the referendum passed, barely, with 53 percent of the 
vote. Almost 45 percent voted against the measure, thereby validating the For 
the Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK faction's strong resistance during 
parliamentary debates this past summer. The amendments allow for the removal 
of naturalization quotas and the granting of citizenship to children born in post-
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independence Latvia. (Latvian Radio, 1100 GMT, 4 Oct 98; BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 5 Oct 98/nexis) 
 
The referendum had garnered international attention and pressure, with several 
countries and organizations making it clear that a rejection of the proposed 
changes would put at risk Latvia's possible integration into Western economic 
and security organizations. That pressure was cited by both camps as motivation 
to reject or support the measure, respectively. (See previous Digests) 
 
Praise for the results could be heard from near and far. The Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe hailed the vote as an important step towards 
solving the problem of integrating ethnic minorities. (ITAR-TASS, 2322 GMT, 4 
Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-278) Officials from the Council of Europe said passage of 
the referendum would aid Latvia's bid to join European organizations. And, 
speaking on state television after preliminary results were collected, President 
Guntis Ulmanis, a supporter of the amendments, said that "for the first time in 
Latvia's history," a Latvian president would sign a law approved by the people. 
(BBC Online Network, 0907 GMT, 5 Oct 98; http://news.bbc.co.uk) "This 
decision, democratically reached through a national referendum, indicates the 
Latvian people's strong commitment to the international human rights standards," 
according to US State Department deputy spokesman James Foley. "This law is 
an important and necessary step in Latvia's road to integrating fully into 
European and Euro-Atlantic institutions," he said. (Agence France-Presse, 1941 
PDT, 5 Oct 98; clari.net) Even Russia, which had long decried Latvia's citizenship 
requirements as constituting human rights violations directed against Russian-
speaking non-citizens, issued what could be seen as a positive reaction, if not 
outright praise, which at this point would have strained the borders of credibility. 
"A clear signal was given... that Latvian people connect the long-term interests of 
their country with achievement of inter-ethnic harmony, integration of society and 
observance of human rights," Russian foreign ministry spokesman Vladimir 
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Rakhmanin reportedly told the Interfax news agency. (BBC Online Network, 0907 
GMT, 5 Oct 98) 
 
Voters also elected a new parliament and, according to preliminary figures, 
former PM Andris Skele's People's Party is the front-runner. With all of the votes 
counted, the results were: The People's Party, 20.93 percent; The Latvian Way 
Union, 18.22 percent; The People's Harmony Party, 14.23 percent; The Union for 
the Fatherland and Freedom-LNNK, 14.15 percent; The Latvian Social 
Democratic Union, 12.87 percent; The New Party, 7.40 percent; The Latvian 
Union of Peasants, 2.46 percent; The Association of the Labor Party, the 
Christian Democratic Union, and the Latvian Green Party, 2.3 percent; The 
People's Movement for Latvia, 1.74 percent; The Democratic Party Saimnieks, 
1.6 percent; The Latvian Rebirth Party, 0.52 percent; The Latvian Unity Party, 
0.52 percent; The National Progress Party, 0.51 percent; The Latvian National 
Democratic Party, 0.35 percent; The Social Democratic Women's Organization, 
0.35 percent; The People's Group Freedom, 0.32 percent; The Land of Mara 
Party, 0.32 percent; The Conservative Party, 0.26 percent; Helsinki-86, 0.22 
percent; The Democrats Party, 0.08 percent; The Latvian National Reform Party, 
0.05 percent. With the five-percent barrier closing off all but six groups, and seats 
given in proportion to the vote, the parliamentary breakdown looks as follows: 
The People's Party, 24 seats; Latvia's Way, 21 seats; For the Fatherland and 
Freedom, and its ally, the Latvian National Independence Movement (LNNK), 17 
seats; The People's Harmony bloc [comprised of the People's Harmony Party, 
the Socialist Party, the Ravnopravie (Equal Rights) Movement and the Russian 
Party], 16 seats; The Social-Democratic Union, 14 seats; and The New Party, 8 
seats. (Agence France-Presse, 2130 PDT, 4 Oct 98; clari.net, and Radio Riga 
Network, 1100 GMT, 4 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-277) Ulmanis said he would do his 
utmost to name a candidate for prime minister on the first or second day of the 
work of the newly elected Saeima after meeting with representatives of the six 
parties/factions which were elected. (ITAR-TASS, 2322 GMT, 4 Oct 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-278) 
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